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Summary 
Most children die in low and middle-income countries as a result of
structural injustice, and while it may not be possible to prove causality
between economic policies and breaches of rights, it is possible to audit
policy and practices through the lens of human rights. Child health
advocates need to highlight the fact that technical interventions, in the
absence of action on structural injustice, cannot address the fundamental
causes of poor health. It could even be said that we collude in the fallacy
that injustices can be solved with technical solutions. The determinants of
health, water, food, shelter, primary education and health care are
minimum core human rights, are the rights required for survival and today
should be available to every child (and their families) in all countries.
However, there are national and global limitations on the ability of
countries to determine policy and generate the revenue required for core
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human rights. The authors conducted a review of the literature on the
main leakages from government revenues in low and middle-income
countries to identify obstacles to children enjoying their right to survival.
Based on the review the authors suggest a framework for an upstream
audit that can be carried out, country by country, to identify barriers in
terms of policies and the generation, allocation and utilisation of revenues.
This audit involves systematically screening the policies and practices of
the main actors: national governments, high-income country partners,
multinational enterprises, and international organisations, for possible
influence on the realisation of human rights. Human rights advocates and
child health associations could lead or commission an upstream audit on
behalf of children in their countries in order to identify the fundamental
causes and real remedies. 
Key words: minimum core economic and social rights; human rights
impact assessment; economic policies; duty bearers; low and middle-
income countries; socio-economic rights; survival rights; children’s rights
1 Introduction 
It is known that in order to survive and be healthy children require
clean water, sanitation, health care and education.1 These are the
minimum core economic and social rights that are critically important
for children. If children do not enjoy these rights and if their mother is
uneducated, they are less likely to survive. Since they are required for
survival, these rights could (or should) be called survival rights.2 Most
children in high-income countries have access to these rights, but
many children in low and middle-income countries do not, which
results in different outcomes, see box 1 and figure1. The risk of a child
dying before the age of five years in low-income countries is 14 times
higher than in high-income countries, namely, 69 per 1 000 live births
in comparison with five per 1 000 live births.3 The fundamental
causes of preventable child mortality are limited access to the
determinants of health or survival rights, and healthcare interventions
can only mitigate the impact.4  
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR
Committee) stated that these rights are of immediate effect and serve
as the lowest bar for countries to progressively realise other human
1 S Kuruvilla, J Schweitzer, D Bishai et al ‘Success factors for reducing maternal and
child mortality’ (2014) 92 Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 533.
2 S Pemberton, D Gordon, S Nandy et al ‘Child rights and child poverty: Can the
international framework of children’s rights be used to improve child survival
rates?’ (2007) 4 PLoS Medicine 1567.
3 World Health Organizaton ‘Global Health Observatory Data’ (2017) http://
www.who.int/gho/en/  (accessed 18 November 2018).
4 B O’Hare, D Devakumar & S Allen ‘Using international human rights law to
improve child health in low-income countries?: A framework for healthcare
professionals’ (2016) 16 BMC International Health and Human Rights 11. 
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rights.5 Many governments of low and middle-income countries do
not have adequate revenue to provide the public services that are
essential to ensure core rights. However, international human rights
law tends to identify the nation state as the sole duty bearer of core
economic and social rights, despite the reduced policy space available
in a globalised world.6 Yet, all states have extra-territorial
responsibilities regarding human rights and, similarly, countries that
have delegated powers to international organisations are responsible
for the decisions of those bodies.7 In addition, General Comment 24
of the ESCR Committee states that high-income countries should not
remain passive but must act to prevent violations of survival rights
abroad by entities domiciled in their territories.8 At the same time,
reduced room for manoeuvre does not exonerate low and middle-
income countries from their responsibilities, and they also are
responsible for the conduct of entities that operate in their territory or
that undertake state functions.9
This interdisciplinary article aims to propose a four-step framework
to facilitate an audit of the national and international influences on
survival rights. It is suggested that this audit is carried out one country
at a time, as the influences vary from country to country. The purpose
of the audit is to identify barriers in order to propose remedies.
2 Methods: Developing a tool to audit the upstream 
influences on survival rights
For most children, access to survival rights depends on public services
(water, sanitation, health care and education), that generally are
provided by governments. Government revenue, as well as allocation
decisions, will influence the amount that is available for public services
and thus survival rights. Government revenue in low and middle-
income countries derives from tax (70 per cent), non-tax revenues
and user fees (11 per cent) and grants or aid (17 per cent).10  
Governments determine domestic taxation policies, but there are
significant and interwoven global influences on taxation, and low and
5 ESCR Committee UN E/C.12/2000/4 General Comment 14 (2000): The right to
the highest attainable standard of health (art 12) para 43. 
6 E Ashford ‘The infliction of subsistence deprivations as a perfect crime’ (2018) 118
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83.
7 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2011).
8 ESCR Committee E/C.12/GC/24 General Comment 24 on State Obligations under
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context
of Business Activities (2017) para 27. 
9 DM Chirwa ‘The doctrine of state responsibility as a potential means of holding
private actors accountable for human rights’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of
International Law 2. 
10 M Moore ‘Obstacles to increasing tax revenues in low-income countries’ http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436437 (accessed 28 November
2018).
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middle-income countries are disadvantaged by international rules, as
a significant proportion of global wealth is held offshore (that is, in
secrecy and in low tax jurisdictions) and is untaxed.11 The amount of
income tax paid by corporations is influenced by the practices of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) working in the country, but tax
policies are also guided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
thus high-income countries. These entities encourage a reduction in
corporate and personal income tax, international trade tax and a
replacement with value-added taxes, often considered to be
regressive.12 When a country is impoverished or indebted, the volume
of aid and credit is significant and decided mainly by high-income
countries, the World Bank and the IMF.13 
An examination of leakages of revenue from low and middle-
income countries’ governments shows that the most significant are
tax avoidance in the informal sector, tax incentives granted to the
corporate sector and international corporate tax avoidance,14 while
other leakages include corruption and debt repayments.15 These
leakages may be increased or decreased by the policies and practices
of MNEs, high-income countries and international organisations, the
IMF and the World Bank. 
Current frameworks to assess compliance with the obligation to
fulfil economic, social and cultural rights are cognisant of the
responsibilities of a state for the realisation of these rights.16 However,
there is a need for an extended framework to include global actors.
Given this gap, we developed a framework to facilitate the systematic
audit of the policies and practices of the main global actors that may
affect leakages of revenue and thus public services and survival rights
in low and middle-income countries, see figure 2. This is similar to
other frameworks developed to analyse the impact of globalisation,
but viewed through the lens of human rights, which are also among
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).17 It is an upstream
extension of the OPERA framework (outcomes, policy effort, resources
11 M Moore, W Prichard & O-H Fjeldstad Taxing Africa: Coercion, reform and
development (2018). 
12 C Kumar ‘Africa rising?’ (2014) https://www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/
2017-08/africa-rising-inequalities-essential-role-fair-taxation-february-2014.pdf
(accessed 28 November 2018).
13 TH Stubbs, AE Kentikelenis & LP King ‘Catalyzing aid? The IMF and donor
behaviour in aid allocation’ (2016) 78 World Development 511.
14 M Curtis & B O’Hare ‘Lost revenues in low income countries’ (2017) 3 http://
curtisresearch.org/publications/lost-revenues-in-low-income-countries/ (accessed
28 November 2018). 
15 B O’Hare & I Makuta ‘An analysis of the potential for achieving the fourth
millennium development goal in SSA with domestic resources’ (2015) 11 Global
Health 8. 
16 Ashford (n 6). 
17 R Labonte & R Torgerson ‘Interrogating globalisation, health and development:
Towards a comprehensive framework for research, policy and political action’
(2005) 15 Critical Public Health 157. 
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and assessment), as the influence of global actors on (a) the policies
and (b) revenues available (generation and allocation) is included.18 
In terms of measuring the outcomes with respect to survival rights,
socio-economic data is collected by many organisations and is widely
available and well-suited to analysing levels of rights, provided the
data is reported as the percentage of the population (and, therefore,
children) who do not have access to water, sanitation, health care and
primary education.19 For example, if 70 per cent of children have
access to improved water, then 30 per cent of children do not have
access to this right. 
3 Results: A four-step audit of upstream influences on 
the survival rights of children in low and middle-
income countries 
The following four steps may be used to systematically analyse the
influences of the national government and global actors on policy
effort and revenue, in terms of both generation and allocation, which
impact the realisation of survival rights, see table 1 for the upstream
influences on revenue. This article highlights some aspects to consider
in each of the steps, but the analysis need not be limited to these
suggestions.
3.1 Step I: National 
3.1.1 Policy effort 
Has the country ratified the international covenants and treaties? Are
survival rights in the constitution and national legislation? Is there an
implementation strategy and guidelines? Are socio-economic rights
justiciable and is justice accessible in the national human rights
system? What are the outcomes of litigation on survival rights or
minimum core economic and social rights? 
3.1.2 Resource generation
The audit of resources should include how effectively a country raises
revenue, including tax, as this will influence the ability to meet their
human rights obligations.20 Has the country designed their tax
regimes to facilitate human rights obligations, for instance, by
18 Centre for Economic and Social Rights The OPERA framework: Assessing compliance
with the obligation to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights (2012) 1 http://
cesr.org/opera-landing (accessed 18 November 2018).
19 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Human rights
indicators: A guide to measurement and implementation (2012) http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Human_rights_indicators_en.pdf (accessed
28 November 2018); O’Hare, Devakumar & Allen (n 4).
20 R Balakrishnan, D Elson & R Patel ‘Rethinking macro-economic strategies from a
human rights perspective’ (2010) 53 Development 27-36 
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redistributing wealth to mitigate social inequalities and to generate a
revenue stream for social goods?21  
Government revenue is lower in low and middle-income countries
than in high-income countries (18 per cent of gross domestic product
(GDP) versus 42 per cent in high-income countries).22 The tax gap is
the difference between revenue collected and what could be
collected, and not taxing the informal sector contributes significantly
to the gap. In many low and middle-income countries, the informal
sector constitutes between 30 and 50 per cent of total productivity.23
If a country does not demonstrate due diligence in raising taxes and is
unable to provide survival rights due to a shortage of revenue, then
human rights obligations are not being met. However, raising taxes in
low and middle-income countries is challenging for logistic and
political reasons. Low and middle-income countries generally are
agricultural and use physical verification rather than account-based
taxing and tax administrations tend to be underresourced regarding
staff and funding.24 Also, there may be a lack of political will to tax
the wealthy elite due to vested interests.25 Tax incentives are
commonly used to attract direct foreign investment, but investors also
need a good infrastructure and regulatory environment, which cannot
be provided without government revenue.26 The IMF and World Bank
note that tax incentives create an administrative burden for tax
authorities and do not promote investment, yet more than half the
African countries offer generous incentives. For example, in 2007 it
was estimated that Mozambique lost 77 per cent of corporate income
tax due to incentives.27 While there is parliamentary scrutiny of
general budgets, tax policies may not receive the same degree of
oversight.28 Donor agencies themselves are often beneficiaries of tax
exemptions, which increases the transaction costs of aid and increases
21 D Mccoy, S Chigudu & T Tillmann ‘Framing the tax and health nexus?: A
neglected aspect of public health concern’ (2017) 12 Health Economics, Policy and
Law 179.
22 Moore (n 10).
23 L Medina, A Jonelis & M Cangul ‘The informal economy in sub-Saharan Africa?:
Size and determinants’ (2017) http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/
2017/07/10/The-Informal-Economy-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-Size-and-Determinants-
45017?cid=em-COM-123-35579 (accessed 18 November 2018).
24 Moore (n 10).
25 A Waris ‘How Kenya has implemented and adjusted to the changes in
international transfer pricing regulations, 1920-2016’ International Centre for Tax
and Development Working Paper 69 (2017).
26 OECD Action plan on base erosion and profit shifting (2013) 
27 Action Aid ‘Give us a break: How big companies are getting tax-free deals’ June
2013, http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/give_us_a_break_-_how_big_
companies_are_getting_tax-free_deals_2.pdf (accessed 18 November 2018).
28 M Hearson ‘Tax-motivated illicit financial flows: A guide for development
practitioners’ (2014) http://www.u4.no/publications/tax-motivated-illicit-financial-
flows-a-guide-for-development-practitioners/ (accessed 18 November 2018).
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tax fraud.29 Import taxes are a vital source of government revenue for
low and middle-income countries, but these have decreased as a
result of liberalisation policies,30 and aid.31
The High-Level Panel on illicit financial flows from Africa has defined
flows as 
money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilised. These funds typically
originate from three sources: commercial tax evasion, trade misinvoicing
and abusive transfer pricing; criminal activities, including the drug trade,
human trafficking, illegal arms dealing, and smuggling of contraband; and
bribery and theft by corrupt government officials.32 
Most instances of illicit financial flight are to avoid taxes, generally
commercial tax abuse. Corporate income tax is due when profit is
declared, and overestimating costs and underestimating profit may be
used for transactions between related entities (called transfer pricing)
to artificially lower profits and thus taxes. Sales between related
entities are supposed to use an ‘arm’s length’ approach to pricing, but
this is rarely used. Profits are thus shifted from jurisdictions with higher
levels of taxation to low tax jurisdictions, which may also have high
levels of secrecy. Tax treaties between high-income countries and low
and middle-income countries are used, and companies are established
in a country where there is a tax treaty in place in order to divert
profits and minimise tax. High-income countries lose the most in
absolute terms, but low and middle-income countries lose the most as
a proportion of revenue.33 The impact is compounded by a heavy
reliance on corporate income tax due to a large informal sector. 
Due diligence is required with respect to raising revenue and
includes taxing the informal sector and the wealthy. In terms of
international corporate tax avoidance, tax treaties and incentives must
be carefully and transparently considered prior to signature and all
MNCs should be required to submit their global country-by-country
reports of profits and taxes paid, to the revenue authorities of the low
and middle-income countries where they operate.
29 V Thuronyi ‘Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters’
(2005) http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/1STM_tax-
aspects-E-C18-2005-9.pdf  (accessed 18 November 2018). 
30 Moore (n 10).
31 W Prichard, JF Brun & O Morrissey ‘Donors, aid and taxation in developing
countries: An overview’ (2012) Report 6 http://www.ictd.ac/publication/donors-
aid-and-taxation-in-developing-countries-an-overview/ (accessed 18 November
2018). 
32 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ‘Report of the High-Level Panel
on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa (2014).
33 A Cobham & P Janský ‘Global distribution of revenue loss from corporate tax
avoidance?: Re-estimation and country results’ (2018) 232 Journal of International
Development 206.
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3.1.3 Resource allocation and utilisation
As well as legislating and raising revenue, governments are obliged to
channel resources towards human rights, and these rights can only be
sustainably funded with a fiscal process that is legitimate (transparent,
accountable and participatory) and uses domestic revenues for public
services in order to strengthen the state-citizen relationship, which, in
turn, will generate ongoing tax revenues.34 Therefore a state’s budget
needs to be aligned with these ambitions. Resource allocation
concerning survival rights should be assessed according to the
proportion of the government’s budget allocated to goods that will
promote human development. Countries that have recently been
involved in conflict tend to spend more on defence and less on health
and education, which will compromise survival rights.35 Corruption,
whether bureaucratic or political, decreases available resources for
survival rights and has a negative impact on economic growth and,
therefore, on tax generation.36 The allocation of government revenue
through a corrupt system will result in public services of poor quality,
which reduces tax morale and increases avoidance.37 Therefore public
spending has little impact on outcomes in the presence of
corruption,38 and the school dropout rate is five times higher in
corrupt countries.39 A more efficient government is more likely to
meet their human rights obligations with scarce resources, for
example, the same amount of health expenditure has a greater
impact on health outcomes where there is good governance.40 An
inefficient administration and procurement practice, overpricing and
absenteeism hinder the implementation of well-intended social
policies.41 
34 A Waris & LA Latif ‘Towards establishing fiscal legitimacy through settled fiscal
principles in global health financing’ (2015) 23 Health Care Analysis 376.
35 B O’Hare & DP Southall ‘First do no harm: The impact of recent armed conflict on
maternal and child health in sub-Saharan Africa’ (2007) 100 Journal of the Royal
Society of Medicine 564. 
36 M Ugur & N Dasgupta ‘Systematic review: Evidence on the economic growth
impacts of corruption in low-income countries and beyond’ (2011) http://
r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/SystematicReviews/Corruption_impact_2011_Ugur
_report.pdf (accessed 18 November 2018).
37 S Gupta, M Verhoeven & ER Tiongson ‘The effectiveness of government spending
on education and health care in developing and transition economies’ (2002) 18
European Journal of Political Economy 717. 
38 I Makuta & B O’Hare ‘Quality of governance, public spending on health and
health status in sub-Saharan Africa: A panel data regression analysis’ (2015) 15
BMC Public Health 932.   
39 Gupta, Verhoeven Tiongson (n 37). 
40 E Willebois, EM Halter, R Harrison et al ‘The puppet masters: How the corrupt use
legal structures to hide stolen assets and what to do about it’ (2011) 267 https://
star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/puppetmastersv1.pdf (accessed 18 Novem-
ber 2018).
41 The World Bank ‘Silent and lethal: How quiet corruption undermines Africa’s
development efforts’ (2010) http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/3160
51468009960660/Silent-and-lethal-how-quiet-corruption-undermines-Africas-
development-efforts   (accessed 18 November 2018).
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3.2 Step II: Multinational enterprises
3.2.1 Influence on policy effort
Multinational enterprises may positively influence policy space with
good corporate responsibility towards the country and communities
where they work or negatively by using bribery or political lobbying
to change policies in their interest.42 MNEs also have huge latent
power due to their ability to relocate investment elsewhere.43
3.2.2 Influence on resource generation 
MNEs positively and significantly add to government revenue through
job creation and taxes. Corporate tax is especially crucial in low and
middle-income countries as the ratio of corporate income tax to other
taxes is much higher than in high-income countries.44 However,
MNEs may seek to avoid tax by eroding their tax base by shifting
profits to low tax jurisdictions or by seeking tax incentives. Favourable
terms are more likely when there is a lack of transparency. Tax
avoided by MNEs in low and middle-income countries ends up in
high-income countries and in offshore financial centres, and the
enabling role of accountants, lawyers and bankers is increasingly
recognised.45 
3.3 Step III: High-income countries including development 
partners 
3.3.1 Influence on policy effort
The role of donors in allocation decisions needs to be carefully
considered, especially where most of the government budget is
derived from aid. It is crucial that survival rights be prioritised by
donors where there is not complete coverage. For example, despite
the importance of maternal education to child health,46 aid allocated
to education is stagnating.47 The non-aid policies of high-income
countries, may indirectly, either positively or negatively, impact
survival rights in low and middle-income countries. For example,
policies that protect the environment and support the transfer of new
technology and fair trade will promote survival rights. Negative
42 Willebois, Halter & Harrison (n 40) 267. 
43 Chirwa (n 9).
44 Moore (n 10).
45 International Bar Association ‘Tax abuses, poverty and human rights’ (2013) http:/
/www.ibanet.org/Human_Rights_Institute/TaskForce_IllicitFinancialFlows_Poverty_
HumanRights.aspx (accessed 18 November 2018).
46 E Gakidou, K Cowling, R Lozano et al ‘Increased educational attainment and its
effect on child mortality in 175 countries between 1970 and 2009: A systematic
analysis’ (2010) 376 The Lancet 959. 
47 UNESCO ‘Aid to education is stagnating and not going to countries most in need’
(2017) http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002495/249568e.pdf (accessed
18 November 2018).
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interventions, such as economic sanctions, military interventions and
financial secrecy adversely impacts survival rights.48 Countries that
initiate or vote for actions on international bodies bear responsibility if
human rights are violated.  
3.3.2 Influence on resource generation 
Aid used for human development, infrastructure and supporting tax
administrations may increase survival rights. However, aid-funded
goods and services are exempt from taxation, and this situation
burdens under-resourced tax administration which compromises the
core objective of establishing a sustainable tax base.49 Donor
conditions may include tied procurement which may be more
expensive and result in an extra level of bureaucracy. 
Tax avoidance by MNEs, often headquartered in high-income
countries which may also be development partners, decreases the
government revenue available for survival rights. Countries that
provide financial secrecy are facilitating tax abuses and thus human
rights abuses.50 Tax treaties between high-income countries and low
and middle-income countries often limit the latter’s ability to tax
MNEs and allows ‘treaty shopping’, which occurs when a subsidiary is
opened in a country which offers the most favourable treaty in order
to divert profits.51 Repayment of debt can reduce the resources
available for survival rights,52 for example, 50 per cent of capital
loaned to African countries as public debt (which has to be repaid),
was deposited in private bank accounts in high-income countries
within months of the loan being granted. Debts that did not benefit
the population, about which they had no knowledge and in situations
where the creditors were aware of the circumstances, are defined as
odious in international law.53 These debts need to be audited and
repudiated, and the role of high-income countries in which the
lending institutions are domiciled need to consider their obligations
when granting loans. Obstacles to trade in agricultural products are
significant and include subsidies granted to farmers in high-income
countries which lowers world prices, and other barriers such as import
tariffs, quotas and stringent phyto-sanitary conditions. High-income
48 Centre for Global Development, ‘Commitment to Development Index’, 2015
http://www.cgdev.org/cdi-2015 (accessed 18 November 2018)
49 Prichard, Brun & Morrissey (n 31).
50 Cobham, Alex, Petr Janský, and Markus Meinzer, ‘The Financial Secrecy Index?
Shedding New Light on the Geography of Secrecy Working Paper 404’, 2015
https://www.cgdev.org/publication/financial-secrecy-index-shedding-new-light-
geography-secrecy-working-paper-404 (accessed 18 November 2018)
51 ActionAid ‘Mistreated The tax treaties that are depriving the world’s poorest
countries of vital revenue’ (2016) http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/
actionaid_-_mistreated_tax_treaties_report_-_feb_2016.pdf (accessed 18 Novem-
ber 2018).
52 O’Hare & Makuta (n 14) 8. 
53 L Ndikumana & J Boyce Africas odious debts: How foreign loans and capital flight
bled a continent (2011) 152. 
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countries may promote the sale of arms to low and middle-income
countries by protecting the profit of arms traders through offering a
guarantee for their investment.54 
3.4 Step IV: International organisations 
3.4.1 Influence on policy effort
The IMF is the gatekeeper for World Bank credit55 and aid flows,56
and is an important player in global development.57 The IMF will
impact survival rights when privatisation is promoted or if a restriction
on social spending prohibits a country’s ability to provide for all.58
The World Bank decides about credit allocation and to whom low-
interest loans are awarded. The scale of their portfolio makes oversight
difficult, and criticisms include their corrupting influence, with 10 to
40 per cent of loans and grants lost due to a lack of fiduciary
oversight,59 corruption impacts the efficiency with which a
government provides survival rights.60 Voting power at the IMF and
World Bank is skewed towards high-income countries (see Table 2).
The failure of countries to meet their obligations to provide survival
rights, as a result of the policies of international organisations is the
responsibility of the countries that have delegated powers to them. 
3.4.2 Influence on resource generation 
Adjustment and poverty reduction loans often come with the
conditionality of reducing import taxes and opening markets to
foreign trade and investment. The reduction in import taxes has
resulted in the loss of government revenue, and most low and middle-
income countries have managed to replace only 30 per cent of this, as
their economies predominantly are informal economies with a narrow
tax base.61 Conditionalities need to be viewed through the lens of
human rights. This requirement may compromise new industries
which may not be competitive in a global marketplace, although, for
importing countries, goods may be cheaper. The IMF has been
involved in the reform of national tax agencies to optimise domestic
resource mobilisation. However, without global tax reform
54 O’Hare & Southall (n 35) 564.
55 CD Gowen ‘IMF conditionality and armed civil conflict?: An analysis of sub-
Saharan Africa’ (2007) http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses/15/
(accessed 18 November 2018).
56 B Clements, S Gupta & M Nozaki ‘What happens to social spending in IMF-
supported programmes?’ (2013) 48 Applied Economics 4022.   
57 Stubbs, Kentikelenis & King (n 13) 511. 
58 AE Kentikelenis ‘Structural adjustment and health: A conceptual framework and
evidence on pathways’ (2016) 187 Social Science and Medicine 296. 
59 S Berkman The World Bank and the gods of lending (2008).
60 Makuta & O’Hare (n 38).
61 O Fjeldstad ‘Taxation and development: A review of donor support to strengthen
tax systems in developing countries’ (2013) WIDER Working Paper 2013/010.
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the impact is likely to be negligible.62 If credit is in the form of a loan
from the World Bank, then repayment may compromise the provision
of survival rights. Loans may be worthwhile if used to support
economic growth and human development, but credit which is not
productive, will result in citizens repaying a debt from which they did
not benefit. 
3.4.3 Resource allocation and utilisation
The allocation of revenue towards survival rights may be influenced by
a budgetary deficit, as debt often results in conditions including the
privatisation of public goods such as health care or education,
reduced social spending and caps on public sector salaries. The IMF
has been associated with these policies, 63 which generally reduces
access to survival rights.
4 Discussion 
The purpose of this audit is to identify modifiable barriers to children’s
right to survive which should increase the efficiency of child advocacy,
as it allows targeting scarce advocacy resources towards the correct
institutions. If violations are identified, it may be possible to remedy
these through negotiation, for example, by requesting that
international assistance prioritises changes in the policies of high-
income countries, which have a spill-over impact on low and middle-
income countries, that is, requesting development partners to have
coherent policies. If tax avoidance plays a role, explaining to MNEs
working in the country the importance of corporate tax to
government revenue, public services and survival rights and
negotiating for increased tax revenues as part of the corporation’s
social responsibility obligations, in preference to, or as well as
sponsoring small projects for the local community.64 
The decision regarding litigation to promote the realisation of core
socio-economic rights will depend on several factors, including
investigating whether the rights are recognised in the constitution;
how easy it is to access courts in the country; the possibilities for
public interest litigation; and how autonomous the judiciary is. A final
question arises as to whether previous social rights litigation has
improved access for the poor and vulnerable in the country. The
62 Moore (n 10).
63 AE Kentikelenis, TH Stubbs & LP King ‘Structural adjustment and public spending
on health: Evidence from IMF programmes in low-income countries’ (2015) 126
Social Science and Medicine 169. 
64 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Docu
ments/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (accessed 18 November
2018).
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various factors need to be weighed and assessed in order to decide
how to proceed.65 
As far as international organisations are concerned, global
institutional arrangements are decided by the governments of affluent
countries, answerable to citizens in these countries, who therefore are
duty bearers for the arrangements made in their name.66 Professional
enablers, such as bankers and nominees of shell companies, are many
steps closer regarding influence or duty, but we are all complicit, by
our voting, banking, consuming and investing decisions if these
contribute to institutions, policies and practices that produce
structural injustices.67
5 Conclusion
Children’s rights advocates have long awaited the resolution of
structural injustices that deprive children of their right to survive.
However, by not vocally advocating for immediate action on survival
rights, we have colluded in the fallacy that technical solutions will
solve problems caused by economic injustices. To close the gap
between de jure and de facto children’s rights to survival, associations
or individuals can start to look upstream for fundamental causes and
remedies of a legal or persuasive nature, country by country, and
advocate immediate change.
65 AE Yamin & S Gloppen (eds) Litigating health rights: Can courts bring more justice to
health? (2011).
66 TWM Pogge ‘World poverty and human rights’ (2005) 19 Ethics and International
Affairs 1.
67 IM Young ‘Political responsibility and structural injustice’ (2003) https://
www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/sociology/pdf/PoliticalResponsi
bility.pdf (accessed 18 November 2018). B O’Hare ‘Active Global Citizenship:
Ethical Living to Promote Human Rights’ Health and Human Rights Journal, https://
www.hhrjournal.org/2018/11/active-global-citizenship-ethical-living-to-promote-
human-rights/.
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Box 1: Minimum core economic and social rights68
68 ESCR Committee General Comment 14 (n 5). 
The minimum core obligations are of immediate effect and require 
states to – 
• ensure the right of access to employment, especially for
disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups,
enabling them to live a life of dignity;
• ensure access to the minimum essential food which is
nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from
hunger for everyone;
• ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation,
and an adequate supply of safe drinking water;
• provide essential drugs as defined under the World
Health Organisation (WHO) Action Programme on
Essential Drugs; 
• ensure free and compulsory primary education to all;
• ensure access to a social security scheme that provides a
minimum essential level of benefits that cover at least
essential health care, basic shelter and housing, water
and sanitation, foodstuffs, and the most basic forms of
education.
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Figure 1: Coverage of minimum core economic, social and cultural 
rights; water, sanitation, primary school education, essential 
vaccination.69
69 The World Bank. Databank – The World Bank. 2018. Available from: https://
data.worldbank.org/ (accessed 18 November 2018).
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Table 1: Upstream influences on government revenue 
(generation and allocation) in low and middle-income countries 
(-) a barrier or likely adverse impact on access to survival rights 
(+) facilitate or likely positive impact on access to survival rights
LMIC
governments
MNE HIC IO
Tax 
avoidance in 
the informal 
economy
Tax 
administra-
tions 
underfunded
/ staffed (-) 
Well-
resourced tax 
administra-
tions (+)
Aid used/not 
used to 
support tax 
administratio
ns. (+/-) 
Embassies 
and aid 
industry pay/
do not pay 
tax. (+/-)
IMF technical 
assistance for 
tax 
administratio
ns (+) 
Global tax 
rules (-) 
Tax 
incentives
Transparency
/no 
transparency 
around 
contracts. 
(+/-)
Parliamentary 
oversight/no 
parliamentar
y oversight of 
incentives 
awarded. 
(+/-)
Aggressively 
seek/do not 
seek tax 
incentives in 
LMIC. 
(-/+)
HIC 
government 
do not 
lobby/do 
lobby LMIC 
to grant their 
MNE tax 
incentives. 
(+/-)
Encourage 
incentives to 
attract 
foreign direct 
investment 
by MNEs 
which do/do 
not avoid 
tax. (-/+)
International 
corporate tax 
avoidance
Legislation/
no legislation 
for country-
by-country 
reporting by 
all MNE 
doing 
business in 
the 
country.(+/-)
Not a 
signatory/
signatory to 
treaties 
which 
reduces tax 
sovereignty.
(+/-)
The use of 
tax planning 
to lower tax 
due in LMIC. 
(-)
Subsidiaries 
in 
jurisdictions 
with low tax 
rates. (-) 
No use of tax 
avoidance by 
MNE. (+) 
Country-by-
country 
reporting of 
profits and 
tax paid. (+)
Public 
country-by-
country 
reporting by 
MNE/no 
reporting by 
MNE. (+/-) 
Regulate/ do 
not regulate 
domiciled 
MNE which 
avoid tax in 
LMIC, (even 
those which 
are 
development 
partners).
(+/-) 
No tax 
treaties/tax 
treaties 
which limit 
LMIC taxing 
ability. (+/-)
Contracts to 
MNE which 
avoid tax. (-) 
Due diligence 
regarding 
awarding 
contracts to 
MNE re tax. 
(+)
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Corruption Strong/weak 
anti-
corruption 
policies.(+/-)
Use/avoid 
bribery to 
obtain 
incentives or 
contracts. 
(+/-)
Do not 
enforce anti-
money 
laundering 
policies or 
support 
stolen asset 
recovery. (-)
No public 
beneficial 
ownership 
legislation. (-) 
Support 
financial 
secrecy. (-)
Little 
oversight/ 
oversight of 
loans and 
grants. (-/+)
Debt 
repayment
Carry out/do 
not carry out 
debt 
audits.(+/-) 
Public aware/ 
unaware of 
credit and 
purpose. 
(+/-)
Support/do 
not support 
debt audits 
and asset 
recovery. 
(+/-)
Loans. (-)
Grants with 
fiduciary 
oversight (+)
Import tax 
barriers to 
exports or 
prices with 
subsidies
Promote 
liberalisation 
policies. (-)
Protect HIC 
industries 
and subsidise 
agriculture. 
(-)
Liberalisation 
policies 
which   tax 
on imports 
and increase 
competition 
for local 
business. (-)
Allocation Minimal/
excessive 
defence 
spending.
(+/-)
No debt/ 
large debt 
repayment. 
(+/-)
Promote 
militarisation. 
(-)
Do not 
promote 
defence 
spending in 
countries 
with low 
survival rights 
coverage. (+)
Aid allocation 
which does 
not prioritise 
survival 
rights. (-) 
Untied/tied 
aid. (+/-) 
Promote 
militarisation, 
license arms 
transfers and 
provide 
credit 
guarantees 
for arms 
exports to 
LMIC. (-) 
The 
privatisation 
of providers 
of survival 
rights. (-)
Promote 
restriction on 
social 
spending. (-)
<
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Figure 2: Conceptual framework to analyse the upstream obstacles 
to survival rights. Step 1-IV of the four step audit of national and 
global barriers
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Table 2: Voting power as a percentage of total at international 
financial organisations.70 
70 The World Bank. International bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD):
SUBSCRIPTIONS AND VOTING POWER OF MEMBER COUNTRIES. 2018, http://
pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/795101541106471736/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf
(accessed 18 November 2018).
The World Bank. International Finance Corporation (IFC): SUBSCRIPTIONS AND
VOTING POWER OF MEMBER COUNTRIES. 2018, http://pub docs.worldbank.org/
en/280961541106482420/IFCCountryVotingTable.pdf (accessed 18 November
2018).
      IMF International Bank 
for Reconstruction 
and Development 
(IBRD)
International Finance 
Corporation 
(IFC)
USA 16.52 15.98 20.99
Japan 6.15 6.89 6.01
China 6.09 4.45 2.30
Germany 5.32 4.03 4.77
France 4.03 3.78 4.48
UK 4.03 3.78 4.48
Italy 3.02 2.66 3.02
Russia 2.59 2.82 3.82
Canada 2.22 2.45 3.02
Saudi Arabia 2.02 2.79 1.91
SUBTOTAL 51.99 49.63 54.8
Rest of World 48.01 50.37 45.2
